

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY-NINTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 2 September 1965, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI

(Italy)

OF MICHIGAN

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A. CORREA do LAGO
Mr. D. SILVEIRA da MOTA

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV
Mr. Y. GOLEMANOV
Mr. D. KOSTOV
Mr. G. YANKOV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA
U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. J.A. BEESLEY
Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. Z. CERNIK
Mr. V. VAJNAR
Mr. F. DOBIAS

Ethiopia:

Lij M. IMRU
Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Mr. T. BEKELE

India:

Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI
Mr. K.P. LUKOSE
Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. E. GUIDOTTI
Mr. S. AVETTA
Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLED0

Mr. M. TELLO MACIAS

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Mr. O.O. ADESOLA

Poland:

Mr. J. GOLDBLAT

Mr. E. STANLEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Mr. H. PAC

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Mr. I. MINZATU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Mr. U. ERICSSON

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. Y.M. VORONTSOV

Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV

Mr. G.K. EFIMOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. S. IBRAHIM

United Kingdom:

Lord CHALFONT

Sir Harold BEELEY

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Miss E.J.M. RICHARDSON

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. P.S. BRIDGES

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

The CHAIRMAN (Italy) (translation from French): I declare open the two hundred and twenty-ninth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. GOLDBLAT (Poland): The discussion of how to stave off the spread of nuclear weapons has taken a lion's share of our five weeks' debate. It is common knowledge that the Government of Poland has been second to none in realizing the threat inherent in the diffusion of the most deadly instruments of war, and more than once has raised its voice in warning against the danger of a nuclear epidemic. We have always considered that the question should be placed high on the priority list of disarmament measures.

We feel, however, that while discussing the issue we should by no means lose sight of the other burning problems which are crying out for solution, especially in the nuclear field. I have in mind, for instance, the ban on the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons. This is not an unfamiliar issue. It has been with us since 1961, when the United Nations General Assembly called upon Member States to convene a conference for the purpose of signing a convention to that effect. (A/RES/1653 (XVI)). It has been examined in some detail in the First Committee of the General Assembly, in this Committee, in the Disarmament Commission and in other international assemblies, such as the Conference of Non-Aligned States which took place in Cairo last autumn (A/5763).

It is true that a commitment by States possessing nuclear weapons not to use them would not do away with the nuclear threat, but it could at least mark the beginning of the end of the era of nuclear terror. An international agreement forbidding the use of atomic weapons as contrary to the laws of humanity and a crime under international law would certainly reflect the world-wide revulsion against those weapons, and could pave the way towards more far-reaching measures of disarmament.

I believe that, as our discussion develops, this important question will receive the attention it deserves. I for one should like to reserve the right of my delegation to speak on the subject, as well as on other proposals such as the abolition of foreign military bases and the removal of troops from foreign territories, or the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests. Any one of them, if carried into effect, would contribute to easing international tension and bringing closer the achievement of a disarmed world. At today's meeting, however, I propose to deal with the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Goldblat, Poland)

Regrettably enough, the respective positions on the issue still remain wide apart. The differences, I am afraid, are seated rather deep in the divergent attitudes to that vital question. The present state of nuclear affairs can hardly be considered satisfactory. Nuclear arsenals are stocked to capacity. Ever new devices with increased capability of mass killing are being invented and tested. Even space is being drawn gradually into the orbit of military activities. It is clear that, unless we arrest the folly of the arms race and reverse the trend, we shall be heading towards a global disaster. Nothing short of destroying the means of nuclear warfare could re-establish the conditions of normal relationship and trust between States, and ease the feeling of awe which is disrupting the fabric of the human mind.

However, long years of negotiations on nuclear disarmament have so far proved fruitless and inconclusive. Discouraged as we are by the attitude of those who refuse to desist from the use of force in international relations and who, in spite of continuous oratory declaiming the virtues of the world rule of law, subordinate international legal restraints to considerations of national policy, we are determined to persist in our efforts. For we hope that those who adopt this attitude will yield to the pressure of international opinion and in their own interest will eventually agree to divest themselves of nuclear armaments.

Yet precious years and months are passing. We should attempt to reach at least some limited agreements which, though not affecting the nuclear stockpiles or the great Powers, would prevent the present situation from getting worse and facilitate progress towards nuclear disarmament. That is precisely the aim of containing the spread of nuclear weapons by checking the extension of the existing structure of nuclear arrangements.

To be effective, a ban on nuclear dissemination has to freeze the present status of all States with respect to physical access to and ownership, disposition, operation and control of nuclear weapons as well as training in their use, planning, and so on. The elements I have mentioned are closely interconnected and constitute a whole. To pick just one element, as the Western Powers have done -- namely that of national control --, whatever its importance, and to ignore the remaining ones is nothing but an arbitrary approach which may defeat the very sense of non-dissemination.

(Mr. Goldblat, Poland)

It is no use discussing the intricacies of political, legal or strategic aspects of the concept of sharing nuclear weapons; for there should be no sharing. It is no use pondering over where the line should be drawn between nuclear and non-nuclear States, or for that matter over how large a margin should be accorded to the West German nuclear strivings; for the ban should be comprehensive and absolute. It is no use arguing which changes in the present nuclear arrangements should be permissible under the non-dissemination agreement as allegedly non-disseminatory, and which should be placed under embargo; for there should be no changes. If I may quote my colleague from Mexico, Mr. Gomez Robledo: "Absence is certainly as clear a concept as 'nothing'" (ENDC/PV.224, p. 38). One thing and one thing only could be allowed: namely, that the nuclear Powers turn non-nuclear.

Members and non-members of military alliances not possessing nuclear weapons must be treated equally. I stress the point because, whilst prohibiting the transfer or control only, the Western Powers leave the door open to various forms of nuclear partnership with their allies through all sorts of collective arrangements, whatever their name. That would raise the present status of non-nuclear States belonging to military alliances as compared to the status of non-nuclear States which are not aligned. In other words, the non-nuclear NATO countries would be unjustifiably accorded special treatment over the other non-nuclear countries. We can ill afford a new division amongst countries. The present one, I submit, is hardly tolerable.

It is an open secret that the ingenious concept of nuclear-weapon sharing has been contrived solely for German consumption, as a result of pressure brought to bear on the Western Powers by the German Federal Republic. Let me substantiate that statement.

The nuclear members of NATO can do without assistance in their atomic strategy from non-nuclear States. They have independent power to use nuclear weapons, and they hardly need German help to make that strategy more effective. Incidentally, in the records of our meeting of 12 August I found a rather curious remark. The representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, said that under the envisaged NATO nuclear collective arrangements the German finger would be placed, not on the nuclear trigger, but on the safety-catch (ENDC/PV.223, p. 24). What strikes me is Lord Chalfont's surprising anxiety to invite a controller to watch over

(Mr. Goldblat, Poland)

the British atomic finger. May I ask respectfully, what for? To prevent it from becoming trigger-happy? But what strikes me even more is the implied suggestion that Poland and other socialist nations should feel reassured, if not jubilant, at the prospect that the controller would be -- of all people -- a West German general. I have noticed that Lord Chalfont is fond of quotations from world literature. Let me therefore quote the following words from Virgil's Aeneid which, I am sure, are familiar to him: "Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes".

Now, coming back to the subject, I am convinced that the United Kingdom Government, and for that matter the United States Government, can dispense with West German tutelage and with the "moderating" influence of the German military. To our knowledge none of the non-nuclear members of NATO, with the notable exception of the Federal Republic, has any desire to be drawn into the nuclear arms race. As far as we know, they do not consider themselves to be under-privileged, discriminated against, or less secure because of a lack of access to nuclear weapons.

We have often been accused by the Western Powers of prejudice with regard to the West German leaders. We have been criticized for imputing to them allegedly non-existent motives. Let us then examine their own pronouncements. I propose to deal, not with statements by individuals, although they in themselves would be a revealing study, but with an official declaration of the Praesidium of the German Christian Democratic Union of 23 August 1964, which was endorsed by the Bonn Government as the credo of the Federal Republic in matters of nuclear policy.

I should like to refer specifically to three points which are germane to the question we are discussing in the Committee: first, the Federal Republic of Germany insists on having a say in decisions concerning nuclear weapons; secondly, it contends that different NATO members should not have different rights; thirdly, it could be a party to disarmament and tension-reducing agreements only in so far as its postulates with regard to the German problem were taken into account. In other words, the Federal Republic demands full participation in the Western nuclear strategy and requests equal rights with all the other NATO members. The declaration makes it absolutely clear that West Germany will not put up with a status of quasi-nuclear or semi-nuclear Power; nothing short of full-fledged membership of the nuclear club will satisfy it, whatever the intermediate stages might be.

(Mr. Goldboat, Poland)

Moreover, the Federal Republic of Germany makes any proposals aimed at the relaxation of tension and disarmament dependent on the solution of the German problem: that is -- as has been explained countless times by its politicians -- on the annexation of the German Democratic Republic and the restoration of the Reich frontiers of 1937.

Those are, I submit, the poison fruits of the policy hitherto pursued by the Western Powers in Europe: the policy of rearming West Germany, not recognizing the German Democratic Republic, condoning West German territorial claims against Poland and others of Germany's eastern neighbours, refusing to recognize the final character of the Polish-German border, turning a deaf ear to bellicose statements by West German leaders and praising their imaginary virtues.

Let us not forget that it was not the policy of military restrictions, but the policy of appeasement and consent to shedding those restrictions, which allowed Nazi Germany to do what she did. We are now faced with a similar situation. The Western Powers may either yield further to West German blackmail, heedless of the consequences; or they may resist the pressure and embark upon a course of action which will spare us the misery and woes of the past.

As to us, we are determined not to remain passive onlookers. We have been persisting and shall persist in our efforts to establish peace and security in the part of the world we live in. We have proposed the setting-up of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe (ENDC/C.1/1). The plan has not been accepted, but it remains valid. Moreover, a desire to bring about at least a halt in the nuclear armaments race has guided my Government in propounding its more recent plan for a freeze of the existing nuclear potential in that region at the present level (ENDC/FV.189, p. 6). The proposal can be easily implemented, given the political will of the West. It would not bring unilateral disadvantages to either side; it would provide mutual advantages for both sides. It would not jeopardize the security of anybody; it would enhance the security of all.

We are not wedded to strict formulae. We are ready to discuss any suggestions for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons in that most sensitive area of the world. We are prepared also to examine the problem of European security in its entirety at a conference specially convened for that purpose.

(Mr. Goldblat, Poland)

We are conscious that the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons is a world-wide problem. If we have ventured to focus the attention of the Conference on Europe, we have done so for the following reasons.

First, being as we are a European nation, a nation which twenty-six years ago, almost to the day, fell victim to the Nazi aggression, and which during the Second World War lost six millions of its inhabitants and thirty-eight per cent of its wealth, we are naturally primarily concerned with the situation on this continent.

Secondly, in the Europe of today two powerful opposing groups, equipped with modern means of instantaneous and mass destruction, confront each other.

Thirdly, revived German militarism, nurtured by the reborn nationalist mood, is a peril endangering peace in Europe -- and not only in Europe. It could lead West Germany's Atlantic allies further than they themselves might perhaps wish to go. There can be no doubt that a military conflict in Central Europe would inevitably degenerate into a world conflagration.

Fourthly, if in spite of protracted talks we have not reached agreement on the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, it is because such an agreement has been blocked by incessant and persistent claims of the Federal Republic of Germany for access to those weapons.

Fifthly, if West Germany's nuclear ambitions were satisfied, a new period of tension and a new phase of the arms race would open up; the existing division of the world into opposing military blocs would become even wider and more acute; the prospects of disarmament discussions would be dimmed, to say the least; and disastrous effects for the cause of peace would ensue.

As long as these apprehensions of ours are not properly understood, and as long as due account is not taken of the security interests of all the countries concerned, no amount of quibbling or of juggling with terminology will bring us closer to agreement. We must bridge the gap between our basic political approaches to the question of non-dissemination before we reach the stage when the help of legal experts is required. What is really needed is a statesmanlike decision to bar West Germany from attaining nuclear weapons in any possible form. The position of the Western Powers on this issue will be a litmus test of their sincerity to move forward on the road to disarmament.

Lij IMRU (Ethiopia): Allow me first of all, since I am speaking for the first time in this session, to extend a warm welcome to the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Chalfont, who at this session is participating in the work of this Conference for the first time and who has already made his mark on our work by his valuable and balanced contribution. I wish also to express my greetings to Mr. Trivedi of India, Mr. Cernik of Czechoslovakia and Mr. Goldblat of Poland, who have returned to the Conference after long absence. Their dedication to the task we are undertaking has already been shown in our previous sessions, and we wish them equal success in this and subsequent sessions.

This session of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has not met in auspicious circumstances. The protracted recess had earlier introduced a lack of urgency into the Committee's work; and with the accumulation of proposals on which we are not making any progress a sense of drift has crept into our proceedings. Further, because its achievements have been meagre, the Committee has not yet inspired a general awareness that real security lies in an ordered process of disarmament, with concrete, realistic and effective agreements concluded at reasonable intervals. For example, no sooner had we concluded the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) than interest in a comprehensive test ban waned, in spite of the commendable efforts of a number of countries represented at this Conference. Governments continue to seek means of ensuring their security in individual or joint armaments programmes, rather than in disarmament measures. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament must reverse this process and restore a measure of confidence in its activities and hope in its endeavours.

The many thoughtful, thorough and well-argued statements that have already been made at this session have clarified the issues that confront us and may open the way to agreements. This has been especially so in connexion with the measures needed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. We are sensible of a certain freshness and vigour, which we hope will reawaken inside and outside the Committee the sense of urgency with regard to disarmament measures which is so vitally relevant in a dangerously overarmed world. We are confident, therefore, that the valuable function of clarification of issues which this session has provided will bear fruit in subsequent discussions, or at our next session.

It is evident that this Conference does not work in a vacuum, divorced from actual realities and forgetful of the world, by which it is certainly not forgotten. Working in an atmosphere of war -- albeit distant, local and limited -- does nevertheless

(Lij Imru, Ethiopia)

undermine our efforts at disarmament and distract us from our essential objectives. However, the fact that we have not allowed the abnormal situation to complicate our task and stultify our deliberations is a good augury. We hope that the efforts of a number of world leaders to ease the tension and promote peace will soon be rewarded with success; otherwise we shall be tossed about by the gyrations of a deteriorating international situation, without succour, like a lonely ship in a stormy sea.

Is the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament condemned to drift, or do we have any hope for a breakthrough in disarmament negotiations? The optimism which the Moscow partial nuclear test-ban Treaty generated has now been dissipated. It is therefore necessary that the basis of confidence should be nurtured by taking concrete and effective steps. In this connexion it is advisable and worth while to concentrate on the two measures to which the international community, through the Disarmament Commission, has given high priority in its resolution DC/225 (ENDC/149) of 26 July 1965. These are a ban on underground nuclear tests and a treaty to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Our delegation is gratified at the amount of interest aroused at this session by efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries which do not at present possess them. The proliferation of nuclear weapons constitutes, without any doubt, a grave menace to the security of all peoples; and it would be in the interest of all countries to give this matter a degree of priority over other measures of nuclear disarmament. There is general agreement that, if nothing is done to arrest the spread of nuclear weapons, the nations of the world will find themselves in a situation wherein the arms race has acquired a new and dangerous dimension. Faith in a reasonable programme of disarmament will be undermined, nuclear rivalries will multiply, and arms control measures will be complicated. The need to abstain from possessing nuclear weapons because of the dangers inherent in the multiplication of nuclear centres is recognized by many countries; but the necessity to enter into firm international obligations not to manufacture or possess such weapons is not fully appreciated because of the real anxiety that countries outside the purview of such obligations will develop nuclear weapons and thus be in a position to threaten and overawe their neighbours.

There is also the additional concern that a non-proliferation treaty does not prevent existing nuclear Powers from continuing to perfect and diversify their nuclear capabilities and to increase their stocks of such weapons and the means for delivering them. Therein lie the seeds of the dilemma that we are called upon to resolve. But

(Lij Imru, Ethiopia)

surely we cannot secure humanity from those dangers by complacently tolerating the emergence of new centres of nuclear dangers; nor can we protect the interest of our countries by blindly engaging in an interminable armaments race.

It is essential to remember, however, as the representative of Brazil, Mr. do Lago, pointed out at our meeting of 17 August (ENDC/PV.224, p.14), that we must not regard a non-dissemination agreement as an end in itself. We appear to have done so in the case of the partial nuclear test-ban Treaty. The nuclear Powers must show by concrete actions that they are determined to put an end to the nuclear arms race in which they are actively engaged, and that they are ready to contemplate reduction of the stocks of their nuclear weapons.

The minimum and most reasonable request we can make is that there should be at least a ban on underground tests. Such measures as the denuclearization of certain key areas and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons are also relevant in this context. A non-proliferation agreement is urgent and should be concluded as soon as possible; but it will lose its value and significance if the arms race is allowed to continue and if existing stocks of nuclear weapons are not reduced and eventually eliminated. However, if we do not accord a non-proliferation treaty a measure of priority and insist on making it a part of the nuclear disarmament programme, it will be like a tree buried deep in the forest of disarmament measures. We should beware that we do not thus unwittingly bury it.

The immediate problem we face is clear: in what perspective should we place a non-proliferation agreement, and what measure of priority should it be accorded? In this context we must be careful not to mix up two separate objectives. There is the vital objective of limiting and reducing existing stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery vehicles. There is the other objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not at present possess them. The question of nuclear disarmament has gripped our attention since the inception of our negotiations. We have a number of proposals before us, ranging from the minimum nuclear deterrent to the freeze of all production of nuclear weapons and the means for delivering them. We also have proposals that deal with questions of inspection to verify that agreed disarmament measures are being carried out.

Nuclear disarmament is a long-term and difficult task that we must eventually achieve in order to survive. We can achieve this goal not by a single stroke but by measured steps, consolidating our gains, increasing international trust and confidence,

(Lij Imru, Ethiopia)

and advancing towards more difficult measures. The fact that we have scored no achievements should not lead us to the false conclusion that our safety lies in acquiring nuclear weapons, thus further complicating the armaments situation, impoverishing our peoples, undermining our economies and opening the way to nuclear anarchy.

It is only because we are sufficiently realistic to believe that our planet is cursed to live with nuclear weapons for some time to come that we have undertaken the hard search to limit their diffusion. Our faith in being able to stop the spread of nuclear weapons will be attenuated if we link this goal to a series of disarmament measures. The prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not at present possess them should be regarded as a separate goal and not be entangled in the wider objective. The temptation to seek to achieve simultaneously both objectives -- that is, far-reaching nuclear disarmament measures and the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons -- would inevitably lead us into a position where we might miss the chance of attaining one of our objectives.

If a number of countries attain nuclear status -- and that is within the realm of the possible -- and if centres of nuclear weapons multiply, the task of achieving nuclear disarmament will be much more protracted and difficult. We shall therefore be faced by a situation in which we have failed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and have at the same time succeeded in rendering our task of nuclear disarmament vastly more difficult than it is at present.

The Ethiopian delegation therefore believes that a high measure of priority should be given to a non-proliferation agreement. However, if we regard the non-proliferation measure simply as an instrument of containment and thus an end in itself, our achievement will be illusory. It will perhaps be necessary to put a time limit on its duration so that we can gauge its efficacy by progress registered in the sphere of general disarmament and related measures -- for it is legitimate to ask ourselves how long a non-proliferation agreement can last if it does not lead to the limitation, reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons and remains a simple ordinance of self-denial on the part of the non-nuclear world.

But the possibility that the value of a non-proliferation treaty may be limited should not deter us from giving it the necessary priority. 'It is in this context that we welcome the draft treaty (ENDC/152) to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons

(Lil Imru, Ethiopia)

submitted by the representative of the United States on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Powers represented at this Conference. Since this draft has been submitted to my Government for its consideration, I will allow myself only a few preliminary remarks. We are happy to see that the prevention of the indirect transfer of nuclear weapons is covered in the draft. Perhaps the text can be broadened, as the representative of the United Kingdom suggested in his statement to the Committee at our meeting of 19 August (ENDC/PV.225, pp. 11, 12). It is also possible that negotiations can yield a compromise redrafting of article I, paragraph 1, of the draft treaty which would allay the misgivings expressed by members of the Warsaw alliance represented at this Conference. This morning we have heard those misgivings effectively explained by the representative of Poland.

The effective solution of this problem is of course a nuclear-free zone in Europe on both sides of the ideological divide. This can allay Eastern European misgivings concerning the spread of the nuclear menace in Europe. We are satisfied, however, that the draft treaty has taken a bold step in the right direction by providing safeguards against indirect proliferation. I should like also to support the observations made by the representative of Nigeria in his penetrating statement at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.228, p.16) that the United Nations should be brought into the picture. Further study of the draft treaty will no doubt reveal problems upon which our delegation may want to comment in greater detail at a future date.

I should now like to make a few observations on the question of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty. Our delegation has previously shared the hope of many delegations that the partial test-ban Treaty would lead to greater things. Our experience during the last two years has not been encouraging. In fact, it is now abundantly clear that the partial Treaty is regarded as an end in itself, since even a ban on underground tests is not seriously contemplated. The partial test-ban Treaty may safeguard the interests of a few big Powers; but since it has not halted the nuclear arms race it cannot be said to protect the interests of all nations and peoples. It has even enabled the nuclear Powers to diversify and perfect their nuclear weapons by undertaking tests without protest from the peoples of the world.

Two years ago it was generally accepted that the partial test-ban Treaty was a temporary measure until technical questions related to the detection and identification of seismic events had been clarified, and the points of view of the two sides on the

(Iij Imru, Ethiopia)

question of the number of on-site inspections to be allowed in each other's territory determined. Even at that time, to say nothing of today, detection and identification techniques had reached a point where the gap between the positions of the two sides had been decisively narrowed. But since that time the gap between them has widened, although certainly not because of technical considerations.

Today we are aware that the techniques of detection and identification have been improved -- and yet we were closer to our objective of a comprehensive test-ban treaty two and a half years ago. This is a sad commentary on the partial test-ban Treaty. The attempt to achieve a kind of perfection in detection and identification can constitute an endless game. What is needed today is the political decision and the ability to accept minor risks in the expectation of making gains in the wider field of disarmament. A vital element lacking is recognition of the need to assure the non-nuclear world that the super-Powers are ready to halt the arms race so that we can turn our full attention to the urgent task of general and complete disarmament.

The imposition of a ban on underground nuclear tests is now overdue. The techniques of detection and identification of seismic explosions have been considerably improved, and in a few years' time further improvements will no doubt reduce the lingering risks involved. In these circumstances it is reasonable to urge the nuclear Powers to agree to a voluntary moratorium covering underground tests. The Ethiopian delegation supports the proposal made at our meeting of 17 August by the leader of the delegation of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Hassan, that there should be a voluntary moratorium by the nuclear Powers under which they would refrain from any further testing pending agreement on the decision needed for a comprehensive test-ban treaty (ENDC/PV.224, p.10).

In conclusion I wish, on behalf of our delegation, to take this opportunity to congratulate the United States delegation upon the brilliant success that its country has scored in the conquest of space with its Gemini 5 experiment. Lieutenant-Colonel Cooper and Lieutenant-Commander Conrad and their Soviet colleagues are pioneers at a new and exciting frontier. We hope it will be a frontier of peace and co-operation. It can be such a frontier only if the Eighteen-Nation Committee can make substantial progress in the task of promoting disarmament.

(Lij Imru, Ethiopia)

Modern technology and communications have reduced the world in size to the extent that all sections of the human race are today close to each other and share common hopes and fears. And yet, in spite of the advances in the technical sphere and especially in the means of communication, we still lag very far behind in the effort needed to understand each other better. We have inherited and adopted beliefs, attitudes and suspicions that keep us seriously divided. Our interests clash: there is the poverty line, there is the racial line, and there is the language line that keeps us apart to the extent that we sometimes talk at cross-purposes -- and all this when advanced technology has devised the nuclear monster which may yet reduce mankind and the civilization it has created.

Can we seriously believe that our efforts are equal to this great challenge? Our task in the Eighteen-Nation Committee is to tame this monster, to reduce world tension, and to build international confidence. This forum is perhaps not an adequate forum, but the fact that it has been convened at this time of international tension testifies to its usefulness. In a world in which the armaments race continues unabated and the nations are still armed to the teeth, wherein an effective peace-keeping machinery has not been established, the sword is dangerously poised above the rule of law. For our work to bear fruit we must emancipate ourselves from the boundaries that constrict us and keep us divided, thus darkening our vision. If we use force for communicating with one another, those elements separating us intensify and our human bonds weaken. The time available to us is not inexhaustible, and we must meet the great challenge which faces us by making progress in disarmament.

Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): Before speaking on the matter for which I have inscribed my name, may I say that I reserve the right to reply later to the remarks made by the representative of Poland this morning? I must say now, however, that I find it discouraging to note that the representative of Poland, like the representative of the Soviet Union the other day (ENDC/PV.228) has managed to discuss the question of non-proliferation without making a single substantive

(Mr. Foster, United States)

reference to the only proposal to halt nuclear spread that is before this Committee, the draft treaty (ENDC/152) tabled by the United States. Instead, he chose to join in the polemics against the Federal Republic of Germany which certain delegations seem determined to substitute for discussion of the world-wide problem of halting nuclear spread. In so doing he seems to make it clear that those delegations wish to give most attention here to the pursuit of political aims instead of giving priority to a serious effort to halt the spread of nuclear weapons. If that is indeed the case, the world will truly know who bears the responsibility for blocking progress toward this end.

Before setting forth my major thesis for today, I should like first to thank the representative of Ethiopia for his comments on Gemini 5, as I thank the representative of Nigeria for his made the other day (ENDC/PV.228, p.20).

I should like to say also that I do share the view of the representative of Ethiopia that we should not let the limited nuclear test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) remain an end in itself; and I hope to demonstrate in my statement today the continuing work in which my country is engaged towards an advance from the start made in 1963 by that Treaty.

In the history of disarmament efforts during this decade no subject has received more study and attention than the problem of a ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. The adoption of the limited test-ban Treaty in 1963 cannot mean any abatement of those efforts. It is essential that the search go on for ways to make that treaty truly comprehensive. My delegation therefore welcomes the statement made by the representative of Ethiopia this morning, as it has welcomed at past meetings the statements made by the representatives of others of the eight -- India, Burma, the United Arab Republic, Nigeria, Sweden, Brazil and Mexico. To contribute to the Committee's understanding of our position on this question, however, I plan to set forth today the current state of our knowledge about the means now available for verifying the observance by all signatories of any future ban on underground tests.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

I must stress, of course, the essentiality of adequate verification. Without it there will be no reasonable assurance that all parties are living up to their obligations under any treaty which is achieved. This is especially important as a factor now. It is well established that both the United States and the Soviet Union have conducted underground nuclear tests and that both consider the results of such tests to have military significance.

We do not share the thought which Ambassador Tsarapkin expressed on 31 August when he touched on the issue of an underground test ban. He then (ENDC/PV.228, p.34) urged the United States to follow the principle established by the limited nuclear test-ban Treaty. That principle was, he said, that only national control measures were to be used and that no inspection arrangements were required.

We suggest that the limited test-ban Treaty established a different principle. For us, that treaty vindicated the position that international obligations in the arms control and disarmament field should be accompanied by appropriate measures of verification. The nature of those measures will depend on what is to be controlled. It is possible that they may be national or that they may be international in form. The important point, however, is that verification measures are necessary.

This is precisely the case with the limited test ban. It applies to those environments where the means of verification could be developed adequately on a national basis. It does not apply to the remaining environment where adequate national means were not available and where the Soviet Union would not concur in the international means we felt to be necessary.

The Soviet Union has not given us so far -- I use the words "so far" -- any sign that it may be prepared to adopt a more reasonable stand on inspections, which would be a feature of international control arrangements for an underground test ban. Therefore the question of the state of the technical art in regard to underground controls on a national basis becomes highly relevant to a consideration of the whole problem.

As all of you know, the United States has been allocating significant resources -- I will not say "dollars", since they appear to have been questioned as a means of measurement, but will say simply "significant resources" -- and scientific talent to its seismological research programme aimed at improving monitoring capabilities.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

In addition to American efforts, important research has been conducted by the scientists of many other nations. Some of the most significant results, for example, have been obtained from the programme carried out by the United Kingdom. Needless to say, all these recently-acquired data have been drawn on in arriving at our present evaluation of the so-called "state of the art".

The "art" about which we are talking here is, as we are all well aware, the ability to detect, locate and identify earth tremors or seismic events. Our problem remains the same as it was when the question was first taken up on an international technical level in 1958. That problem is: how to find out when underground events have occurred, where they have occurred and, finally, whether they were caused by an earthquake or a nuclear explosion. In this regard the chief difficulties have arisen in relation to earthquakes falling into the range of lower seismic magnitudes. Such magnitudes are those which correspond to the energy released underground by the detonation of a nuclear weapon having a yield of about twenty kilotons or less. As a consequence a great deal of our research programme has addressed itself to overcoming these difficulties.

Accordingly much effort has been directed at the determination of what, if any, differences might be observed in the seismic signals received at great distances from underground disturbances when on the one hand the signal emanated from a nuclear explosion and on the other the signal came from an earthquake. In order to be able to study these signals with precision so as to determine their characteristics, it became necessary first to get a good record of the desired signals. This is much more complicated than it may sound, because seismic signals from a single source point are not registered on seismographs at great distances in a pure form. On the contrary, the lines on the seismogram are distorted by the effects of extraneous earth motion, called microseismic noise, which is also recorded by the instrument. Thus the task is to purify the record, so to speak, by getting rid of this background noise. If we could do so, the real seismic signal, which it is important to analyse in connexion with an underground test ban, would be available for study.

Research has shown that microseismic noise can be greatly reduced through the use of arrays -- that is, groups of instruments arranged in a particular pattern. A prototype array containing 525 detectors distributed over an area of 200 kilometres

(Mr. Foster, United States)

in diameter is being constructed in the State of Montana in the United States. It is not yet in operation. Nevertheless we expect that this array will lead to a signal-to-noise ratio at least ten times greater than that heretofore available at the quietest single-instrument surface stations now in existence.

Other means of collecting more and better seismic data are also being investigated. For example, an ocean-bottom instrument has been developed which is capable of recording for a thirty-day period. After this period it is retrieved on to the surface, where its recorded data are examined. If such instruments were put into operational form it would be possible to place them permanently on the ocean floor and to use cables for obtaining their data by telemetry. Ocean-bottom seismometers of this kind would be especially significant in achieving an improved capability to locate events near ocean shorelines. Another example of improved data collection is the placement of instruments in deep wells on land. There is also a major programme to design improved detection instruments.

The prospects are good that in the future we shall have data available for analysis that will be in much purer and more usable form than in the past. We see that simultaneously we shall have much more of these data -- in fact great quantities of data. Through the application of solid-state circuitry and the use of digital computers it will be possible to process and analyse these mounds of information.

All of this should allow us to bring about a substantial improvement in the means for detection, location and identification. However, before indicating the probable magnitude of this improvement I will mention that the United States has been anxious also to arrive at a better understanding of seismic wave patterns and the peculiarities of their travel through the earth. This has led us to carry out several underground nuclear detonations in areas other than the established test sites for such devices. The purpose of these experiments has been threefold: first, to observe how differences in the rock and geological conditions at the point of origin of the seismic event influence and cause variations in the resulting seismic signal; second, to observe the patterns of seismic wave propagation from as many different points of origin as possible; and third, to learn what differences may exist between seismic signals from earthquakes and those from underground nuclear explosions originating in the same region.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

To obtain these data the United States has carried out not only detonations at the Nevada test site but also the "Gnome" test in New Mexico, the "Shoal" test in northern Nevada, and the "Salmon" test in Mississippi. We expect to explode late in 1965 the so-called "Longshot" test in the Aleutian Islands. This will enable us for the first time to observe signals from an explosion in an area where there are many earthquakes. We already have many wave patterns from natural events which have taken place in that region. Comparison of them with the patterns from a nuclear explosion will then be possible. The United States will furnish to interested governments appropriate data about the Longshot test. We would appreciate receiving from others the seismic data which they may acquire from that explosion.

Let me now return to the results which research efforts have produced to date. The use of large arrays of detectors with their greater sensitivity in comparison with single-point detectors means that we should be able to detect smaller earth tremors than before. We hope to be able in due course to detect in most rock formations both earthquakes and explosions of a magnitude equivalent to nuclear detonations having yields in the hundreds of tons range -- that is, equivalent to less than one kiloton of TNT. Even in dry porous materials such as alluvia deposits the detection minimum will be of the order of a kiloton. Deposits of this type of material, however, are limited.

An even more important feature of large arrays, however, is their capacity to obtain higher signal-to-noise ratios by filtering out background or microseismic noise. This will make possible more accurate readings of the characteristics of signals and will assist in identifying the original nature of those signals which are detected. The net result is that, if a world-wide system of large arrays is constructed in the future, it should be possible to detect seismic events in the range of a few hundred tons. It should also be possible to identify about 80 per cent of the events which produce seismic signals that correspond to yields above a few kilotons. Only about 20 per cent of events of a yield equivalent to above a few kilotons would remain unidentified.

In specific terms, we estimate that, given a world-wide system including large arrays, all natural seismic events of a seismic magnitude of 4.0 or greater could be detected. To apply this to the Soviet Union, it is our understanding that in an average year the number of seismic events of this size occurring in that country

(Mr. Foster, United States)

which could be detected but not identified as earthquakes by this world-wide system would be about forty-five. Moreover, even then certain of those forty-five unidentified events which occurred near an ocean could be identified through the use of the ocean-bottom seismometers which I mentioned earlier.

I must stress that the foregoing major improvements would only result from a world-wide system of large arrays. Naturally such a system would take time to build, and its construction would require the co-operation of a number of countries. Once the system were installed, it would make it possible to use four primary methods of seismic signal identification. These would be: first, the determination that the direction of the first motion of the signal was compatible only with an earthquake; second, the observation that the wave pattern of the signal involved complexities greater than observed in the case of nuclear detonations; third, the finding that the location of the geographical point of origin of the event was in water; and fourth, evidence that the event took place at great depth below the surface.

The conclusion which the United States Government has drawn from the scientific state of affairs which I have set forth is that we believe we shall be able to determine the nature of a substantially greater proportion of seismic events than we now can. This has important consequences for the problem of verification, since our inability to identify a high fraction of events by means of instrumentation has always been the most serious obstacle to over-all technical advance. At the same time, however, it is still apparent that a significant fraction of underground events above a certain size -- specifically 20 per cent above a few kilotons -- will not be identified by seismic instruments. We shall still not find it possible to say in those instances whether the seismic signal originated in an earthquake or in a man-made nuclear explosion.

It follows, of course, that we shall want to be assured in other ways that these unidentified events in the Soviet Union are not nuclear explosions. We believe that the only method available for giving this reassurance -- and for generating the international confidence which alone will guarantee the permanence of the treaty -- is the use of on-site inspections. Up to now we have not heard any feasible suggestion for another means of verification which could fulfil that indispensable requirement.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

We call here on the Soviet Union to contribute its own data and to participate in technical discussions, either before this Committee or in a smaller forum. We would welcome the ideas of any and all delegations about such problems as the detection and identification of earth tremors.

We remember vividly that Soviet scientists had many ideas for improvements in the scientific methods of detection and identification when they talked over those matters with United Kingdom and United States scientists in Geneva in November and December of 1959 and in May of 1960. Surely work must have gone on and gone forward in the Soviet Union on these problems in the intervening years. Judging by Soviet technical progress in other fields, I am sure that major steps forward must have resulted in this field as well. It is high time that the rest of us were allowed to share in the fruits of such efforts. They are of direct relevance to the early conclusion of an underground test ban.

There has never been anything immutable or sacred about specific details of verification. Our views on the adequacy of any given arrangement for verification will be influenced in the future, as in the past, by the technical situation which is known to confront us. Thus, most assuredly, we intend to take into account all of the potential improvements in the technical situation which I have noted to you here today. Moreover, we are certainly prepared to work out inspection arrangements which, though effective, are reasonable and which minimize intrusiveness. Our sole concern is to produce a comprehensive treaty which will give us every confidence that it is being observed by all parties. We ask the Soviet Union and all the nations represented here to cooperate with us in the search for such an agreement. I repeat, we are willing to discuss any proposal which can provide satisfactory assurance of compliance.

LORD CHALFONT (United Kingdom) : I propose to take only a few minutes of the Committee's time this morning. I hope at a later meeting to offer some specific thoughts on how we might best make further progress in our deliberations here and in New York. For the moment, my concern is to seek a firm foundation for my own future thinking.

That great controversialist, Dr. Johnson, once said that it was possible to enter into profitable discussions with a man on any subject provided that he would first clearly define his terms. I want to make yet one more attempt to persuade my colleague the representative of the Soviet Union to define the terms upon which he is ready to engage in serious negotiation on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. But before

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

addressing myself to that stimulating task, I should like to congratulate the representative of Ethiopia on his valuable contribution to our discussions, and incidentally to thank him for his kind personal welcome to me.

I must congratulate the Polish representative on his most remarkable speech this morning. I shall want to comment on it substantially later. The fact that I found very little in it with which I could agree does not deter me from recognizing and welcoming a most thoughtful and powerful expression of his point of view. I hope he will agree with me that a rough translation of his Latin phrase is "I fear the Greeks, especially when they come bearing gifts". I know he will forgive me if I am forced to the conclusion that we must now fear the Poles, especially when they are making speeches.

I should like to refer briefly to the first speech delivered at our last meeting, that given by the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Obi (ENDC/PV.228, pp. 5 et seq.). It was a particularly comprehensive, thoughtful and constructive contribution. I should like to thank Mr. Obi not only for the support he expressed for the United States draft treaty on non-dissemination (ENDC/152) but also for the detailed consideration he had evidently given to the text. As Mr. Foster pointed out on 17 August (ENDC/PV.224, p. 17), the present text is intended to be a sincere and constructive basis for negotiation. We welcome constructive comments even if they are critical; we are anxious to explain the processes of thought that have led us to the particular form which the draft now takes. We are ready to make changes if they are conceived in the spirit of our basic aim - to protect the world from the danger of nuclear anarchy.

With that in mind, let me now turn to Mr. Tsarapkin's speech of 31 August. There are times when I suspect that Mr. Tsarapkin, who is always eloquent and persuasive, may himself be less than totally convinced by his own arguments, and this was one of those occasions. He went on at considerable length about foreign bases - not for the first time. He described them, if I have his words aright, as "springboards of aggression" (ENDC/PV.228, p. 25). He would have us believe - and I quote his own words - that:

"... in the United Nations Disarmament Commission there was not a single delegation - apart of course, from the representatives of the NATO Powers - that regarded the existence of foreign bases and troops in other States as a blessing for the world or as a factor of international stability." (ibid., p. 27).

Everyone has access to the records of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, and the records hardly bear that out. I shall not take up time with an exhaustive list of

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

pronouncements made at the Disarmament Commission on the subject of bases, but to take one or two at random, the representative of Togo, Mr. Ajavon, pointed out that -

"... the presence of foreign troops on the territory of other nations is only the obvious consequence of the existence of international tension and the arms race ... The cause has to be tackled, and not the effects."

(DC/PV.93, pp. 13-15 of the provisional text)

The Malaysian representative, Mr. Ramani, also said:

"The presence of foreign bases and troops with the concurrence and authority or at the request of one's own State, far from being a threat to freedom, may be its greatest safeguard." (DC/PV.99, p.13 of the provisional text)

The representative of Nigeria, Chief Adebo, remarked:

"Some foreign bases are not the cause, but the consequence, of international tension." (DC/PV.78, p.8-10 of the provisional text)

Other speakers on the subject, including the representatives of the Congo, the Cameroons, the Lebanon and Jordan, all pointed out that bases might well be necessary for self-defence, and that they were entirely compatible with the sovereign rights and indeed the obligations of States to provide adequately for their defence.

I say all this not to reopen the substantial argument about bases, but simply to demonstrate that the Disarmament Commission was far from recording a general denunciation of all bases, whatever the Soviet representative may now imply. If it had, presumably the Soviet draft resolution (DC/218) would now bear the imprint of the Disarmament Commission's approval; but it does not, and nothing will alter that fact, because of course, for obvious reasons, it was withdrawn at the last moment.

When he came to talk about Western proposals, Mr. Tsarapkin again treated us to a remarkable display of intellectual sleight-of-hand. The Western delegations, he made out, had contented themselves with either perfunctory references to general and complete disarmament or with vague hints about possible changes in their positions. The Western delegations, he said, merely repeated their old, obsolete measures which would not eliminate the threat of a nuclear missile war. What does the Soviet Union propose in the way of disarmament? I feared some weeks ago that Mr. Tsarapkin's unusually pre-emptive phrase in his opening speech of 27 July, "The Committee has before it more than enough proposals on that score" (ENDC/PV.218, p.8), might be an indirect way of saying that the Soviet Union had no new proposals to offer and hoped moreover that it would not be confronted with any. Events here in this Committee have done nothing to dispel my fears.

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

But that is not my point; I am ready to accept that for reasons of its own the Soviet Union, for its part, has for the moment nothing new to offer; but what has been its reaction to the one new proposal formally tabled at this session? I refer, of course, to the draft non-dissemination treaty (ENDC/152). The Soviet reaction seems, on the face of it, to have been one of initial rejection, since, to quote Mr. Tsarapkin again -

"... the discussion ... on the question of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons shows that there is still no common basis for an agreement on this subject."

(ENDC/PV.228, p. 35)

I do not propose at this stage to comment in detail on his remarks on the subject; I shall hope to do so at a later meeting. In any case this is not, I hope, the Soviet Union's final word. At an earlier meeting I urged that every proposal should be considered on its merits. And we would, I think, all hope that the Soviet delegation will treat our proposal with the same seriousness that lies behind our action in putting it forward.

I accept that the Soviet position springs not from a desire to make propaganda - although Mr. Tsarapkin has lost no opportunity to make it - but from genuinely held fears and preoccupations. When I last spoke, on 19 August, I asked Mr. Tsarapkin some exact and sincere questions about the nature of these fears (ENDC/PV.225, p. 12). So far we have had no answers. Mr. Tsarapkin has simply repeated that non-dissemination cannot be reconciled with plans for nuclear sharing in the Western alliance; and the representative of Poland has, with variations, played a solo on the same theme.

It is true that we in the Western Alliance are engaged in considering certain arrangements which we hope soon to carry to a satisfactory conclusion. As I have said before, we are determined that those arrangements shall not be disseminatory, and we are convinced that they contain no seed of danger for the Soviet Union or the other Warsaw Pact countries. We recognize that, as on so many issues, there may be two views about this. I should like to think that we could discuss those views intelligently and have the opportunity, for our part, of demonstrating that our plans give no cause for fear; that they could not, in fact, be used as a stepping-stone for any country that might, in the view of the Warsaw Pact Powers, have national nuclear ambitions of its own.

Surely we are here to find some way of making these matters clear to each other. Surely we cannot accept that this Conference, with its breadth of experience and its almost unlimited power for good, should be allowed to deteriorate into what one newspaper

(Lord Chalfont, United Kingdom)

correspondent has called a mere dialogue of the deaf. We in the West are prepared not only to talk but also to listen, as we have listened carefully to our Polish colleague this morning. There is evidence that the non-aligned countries look upon this in much the same way. It is for the Soviet Union and its allies to decide whether they want to bear the heavy responsibility of dismissing the proposal of the United States without discussing it seriously and in depth. I cannot, especially after the remarks of our Polish colleague this morning, believe that they will do so.

The remarks that we have heard from our United States colleague this morning are, I think, an example of how important it is that we should go on exchanging ideas and information. I shall, of course, want to comment later at length on the implications of what he said. For the moment perhaps I might be allowed just one more quotation, by way of a text for our further discussions and in the most friendly way, lest our Polish colleague might feel too triumphant after his performance this morning. It is also, he will be glad to hear, in Latin, and it will be familiar to any international lawyer in this Committee: multis melior pax una triumphis - one peace is better than many triumphs.

Mrs. MYRDAL (Sweden) : The Swedish delegation today has the honour of tabling a short document for the information of delegations to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. It is entitled "Memorandum on International Cooperation for the Detection of Underground Explosions" (ENDC/154).

Our delegation has sincerely regretted that during this session the test-ban issue has so far not been given much scope, or much substantive discussion with participation of the nuclear Powers - and, still less, any real negotiations. However, this paper of ours does not lay claim to form a basis for such discussion. The extended co-operation which it deals with is expected to grow organically out of the co-operation already initiated by the experts and stations in the field of seismology. Consequently I do not suggest that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should take any action on this matter. On the other hand, questions have so often reached us concerning the content of the paper which was originally presented by the scientific advisors to our delegation to the fourteenth session of the Pugwash Conference (Proceedings, p. 228) that our delegation wanted to provide, for information, a text containing the views of the Swedish delegation on this matter.

Mr. OBI (Nigeria): As one who has consistently and for a long time called for disclosure of the degree of detection and identification reached by the nuclear Powers, I should like to express my sincere thanks to the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster, for the most valuable statement which he made this morning. We shall give it very close study.

Meanwhile, we should be grateful if Mr. Foster would give us further clarification on one point. He said, if I heard him correctly, that about 20 per cent of events above a few kilotons could as yet not be identified. We wonder whether Mr. Foster is in a position to disclose the number of kilotons referred to as "a few" -- whether it is about 20, 10, 5 or whatever it is.

May I also express satisfaction at the very useful nature of our meeting this morning? If I may say so, it has been perhaps the most fruitful meeting we have had during this session.

I should like also to convey my congratulations to the representative of Ethiopia on his very useful statement, and to thank the Swedish delegation for at last making available to us the very valuable memorandum which we have heard so much about.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 229th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Cavalletti, representative of Italy.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Poland, Ethiopia, the United States, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Nigeria.

"The delegation of Sweden tabled a memorandum on international co-operation for the detection of underground nuclear explosions.^{1/}

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 7 September 1965, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.

